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Abstract
A two-phase beamforming solution for secure communication using untrusted relay nodes is pre-
sented. To thwart eavesdropping attempts of relay nodes, we deliberately introduce artificial noise in the
source message. After pointing out the incongruity in evaluating secrecy rate in our model for certain
scenarios, we provide an SNR based frame work for secure communication. We intend to bring down
the SNR at each of the untrusted relay nodes below a certain predefined threshold, whereas, using
beamforming we want to boost the SNR at the destination. With this motive optimal scaling vector is
evaluated for beamforming phase which not only nullifies the artificial noise transmitted initially, but
also maximizes the SNR at the destination. We discuss both the total and individual power constraint
scenarios and provide analytical solution for both of them.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently omnipresence of wireless devices prompted the researchers and engineers to delve
into the security issues of wireless communication. As compared to wired medium, ensuring
security for wireless medium is more challenging mainly due to the broadcast nature of the
transmission. But the ongoing research on physical layer security promises robust and reliable
security schemes for wireless communication. Contrary to conventional cryptographic schemes
physical layer security techniques are impregnable as the security is ensured by inherent ran-
domness present in the wireless medium.
Physical layer security came to existence through the seminal work of Wyner [1], where he
explored the possibility of secure communication without relying on private keys. Later Leung
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2and Hellman [2] extended this idea to Gaussian channels. Following their works, in last decade
several researchers have devised techniques for secure communication in single-hop single and
multi-antenna systems. Recently a considerable amount of research is ongoing to extend those
schemes to multi-hop network scenarios. In fact, several works have demonstrated that cooper-
ative relaying [3, 4] can significantly improve the performance of secure communication. One
such cooperative scheme is beamforming, where multiple transmitters adjust their gain and phase
to improve the signal strength at the destination. Though beamforming was initially developed
for multi-antenna systems, but due to energy and hardware constraints distributed beamforming
solution using multiple single antenna node is proposed [3, 4]. In those papers authors have
assumed that relay nodes are trustworthy and they beamform towards the destination to defeat
(an) external eavesdropper(s). But due to the unprotected nature of public ad hoc network (e.g.
sensor network), an adversary can wiretap those relay nodes to obtain the information transmitted
by source. This prompted us to look for a solution of one of the worst adversarial scenarios of
secure communication, where one have to maintain the secrecy of data from the participating
relay nodes. Secure transmission using untrusted relay nodes has appeared before in [5–8],
where secure communication is obtained by simultaneously transmitting two or more signals.
But multiple simultaneous transmission in the above mentioned papers were possible due to
mutiple sources and/or multiple jammers. In absence of mutiple sources or jammers source has
to rely on artificial noise [9]. Authors in [10] considered artificial noise based beamforming
solution for AF relay network, but unlike them we have untrusted relay nodes and artificial
noise is introduced by the source itself.
In our work we have considered multiple amplify-and-forward (AF) untrusted relay nodes,
who help the source to deliver the message at destination, but at the same time can eavesdrop the
ongoing transmission. To prevent eavesdropping the source adds artificial noise in the message
and broadcast it in first phase. In second phase source and relay nodes beamform to deliver
the signal at the destination. Though secrecy rate is the conventional metric to evaluate the
performance of such system, but for our model in certain scenarios maximizing secrecy rate
results in removal of artificial noise. Therefore, we consider a pragmatic approach based on SNR
criteria, where we intend keep the SNR at the untrusted relay nodes below certain predefined
threshold. Assuming perfect channel state information (CSI), we evaluate the optimal scaling
factor for all the transmitting nodes which not only nullifies the artificial noise but also maximizes
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Fig. 1. Simple two hop network with multiple relays
the SNR at the destination. We consider both the total and individual power constraints scenario
for all transmitting nodes and provide analytical approach for optimal solutions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a two-hop network shown in Figure 1 containing multiple relay nodes (M =
{1, 2, . . . ,M}) aiding the transmission from source node S to destination D. Adversary is using
the relay nodes to passively eavesdrop the on going transmission. To prevent such eavesdropping
source transmits artificial noise along with the actual signal to confuse the adversary. In next
phase source along with the relay nodes performs beamforming to deliver the message to the
destination. We are interested in maximizing the information rate which can be transmitted from
the source to the destination securely.
In first phase source transmits a linear combination of two messages
√
αP1x+
√
(1− α)P1u
using power P1, where α ∈ [0, 1], x is the Gaussian distributed message with zero mean and
unit variance and u is statistically independent Gaussian distributed artificial noise with identical
distribution as x. The message received at relay and the destination can be written as:
yi = hsi(
√
αP1x+
√
(1− α)P1u) + zi, i ∈M
⋃
{D}
where zi are complex Gaussian noise distributed according to CN (0, σ2). In second phase
relay nodes along with the source performs beamforming at destination to nullify the artificial
noise. In amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying scheme nodes transmit the received noisy message
after scaling it by appropriate factor, wi ∈ C. Source simultaneously transmits
√
αP1w0x −
4√
(1− α)P1
M∑
i=1
wihsihid
hsd
u. Therefore, the received message at destination can be written as:
yd =
√
αP1(w0hsd +
M∑
i=1
wihsihid)x+
M∑
i=1
hidwizi + zd
Assuming Maximum Ratio Combining (MRC) [3], capacity of the source to destination channel
can be written as:
Cd=
1
2
log
(
1 +
|hsd|2αP1
σ2 +|hsd|2(1− α)P1 +
|h†w|2αP1
σ2(1 +w†Dhw)
)
where w = [w0, w1, · · · , wM ]†, h = [hsd, hs1h1d, · · · , hsM
hMd]
†, and Dh is (M+1)×(M+1) matrix with diagonal elements [0, |h1d|2, |h2d|2, · · · , |hMd|2].
As the relays can receive only during the first phase, so the capacity of the source to relay
channel is:
Ci =
1
2
log
(
1 +
|hsi|2αP1
σ2 + |hsi|2(1− α)P1
)
The total power consumed during the second phase can be calculated in following manner:
αP1|w0|2 + (1− α)P1
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
hsihid
hsd
wi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
M∑
i=1
(|hs,i|2P1 + σ2)|wi|2 = w†Dw
where D =
αP1 0t
0 (1− α)P1gg† +T
, g is M length vector with ith element gi = hsihidhsd and
T is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements [|hs,1|2P1 + σ2, · · · , |hs,M |2P1 + σ2]. Therefore,
the total power constraint can be expressed as
w†Dw ≤ Ptot (1)
For several scenarios individual constraint is more relevant than total constraint. Those constraints
can be written as:
w†Dsw ≤ Ps (2a)
|wi|2 ≤ Pi|hsi|2P1 + σ2 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} (2b)
5where Ds =
αP1 0t
0 (1− α)P1gg†
. Now for a given total or individual power budget maximum
achievable secrecy rate can be formulated as following optimization problem:
max min
i
Rsi(α,w) = Cd − Ci (3a)
Subject to: (1) or (2)
α ∈ [0, 1] (3b)
We denote the SNR at ith relay node as Γi =
|hsi|2αP1
σ2+|hsi|2(1−α)P1 . One can easily see that Γi is
an increasing function in |hsi|2, ∀α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, if we order the source to relay channel
gains according to their absolute values, then the one with the highest value will have maximum
SNR. Formally,
Γe ≥ Γi, where e = arg max
i
[|hs1|2, . . . , |hsM |2]
Therefore, the objective of the problem (3) can be rephrased as maximize Cd−Ce for the same
constraint set. We rewrite Cd − Ce in following manner:
Cd − Ce= 1
2
[
log
(
ρd
ρd − α + f(w)α
)
− log
(
ρe
ρe − α
)]
where ρj=
(
σ2
|hsj |2P1 + 1
)
, j∈ {d, e}, f(w) = |h†w|2P1
σ2(1+w†Dhw)
By differentiating the objective function with respect to α, we have the following observation.
Observation. Cd − Ce is an increasing function of α in [0, 1] if
f(w) ≥ (ρd − ρe)ρd
(ρd − 1)2(ρe − 2)
assuming ρe 6= 2.
But if we use α = 1, then in absence of artificial noise, relay nodes can properly decode the
message. So, we consider an SNR based approach, where an SNR upto γ results in significant
amount of BER in eavesdropping relay nodes and therefore, for all practical purposes we can
assume that the message is undecodable at relay nodes. The Optimization problem (3) can be
rewritten as:
maxCd (4a)
subject to: Γe ≤ γ (4b)
(1) or (2), (3b)
6III. ANALYSIS & SOLUTION
From the optimization problem (4) one can easily see that to maximize Cd, Γe should be
equal to γ. Therefore, we can calculate the corresponding α and also using the constraint (3b)
we can bound the γ value.
α(γ) =
1 + σ
2
|hse|2P1
(1 + 1
γ
)
, where γ ≤ |hse|
2P1
σ2
Total Power Constraint: Once α is fixed the first term in the destination SNR is constant,
therefore, optimization problem (4) can be reduced to:
max
|h†w|2
(1 +w†Dhw)
(5a)
subject to: w†Dw ≤ Ptot (5b)
One can check that the constraint will be satisfied with equality at optima and the objective
function can be written as: w
†(hh†)w
w†D˜w
, where D˜ = 1
Ptot
D + Dh. This is indeed the well known
generalized Rayleigh Quotient problem [11, p. 176] for which the maximum value of the
objective function corresponds to the maximum eigenvalue of matrix D˜−1hh†. The solution
can be expressed as w∗ = µv where v = D˜−1h and µ =
√
Ptot
v′Dv .
Individual Power Constraints: : The individual power constraint problem for AF relaying can
be written as:
max
|h†w|2
(1 +w†Dhw)
(6a)
subject to: (2)
It can be seen that the angles of the scaling factors should be chosen in following manner to
obtain the optimal value.
arg(w0) = − arg(hsd), arg(wi) = −(arg(hsi) + arg(hid)),∀i
Therefore, if we denote c = [|hsd|, |hs1|, · · · , |hsM |]t and u = [|w0|, |w1h1d|, · · · , |wMhMd|]t,
then the optimization problem (6) can be essentially written as:
max
(ctu)2
(1 + utI0u)
(7a)
subject to: utD̂su ≤ Ps (7b)
0 ≤ ui ≤ umax,i, ∀i ∈M (7c)
7where I0 =
0 0t
0 I
, D̂s =
αP1 0t
0 (1−α)P1|hsd|2 hsh
t
s
, umax,i = √ Pi|hsi|2P1+σ2 , I is a M×M identity
matrix, and hs = [|hs1|, |hs2|, · · · , |hsM |]t.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution for problem (7) with only source constraint i.e. (7b) is given
by: u∗1 =
√
η1 − η2||c〈2〉||2r∗2, u∗〈2〉 =
c〈2〉
||c〈2〉||r
∗ where r∗ =
√
||c〈2〉||2η1
||c〈2〉||4η2+(η1+||c〈2〉||2η2)2c21
Proof: We denote the vector [u2, u3, · · · , uM+1] as u〈2〉, then the objective function can be
rewritten as:
(c1u1 + c
t
〈2〉u〈2〉)
2
1 + ||u〈2〉||2
Now it is easy to see that, if ||u〈2〉|| = r, then maximum value of ct〈2〉u〈2〉 =
c〈2〉
||c〈2〉||r. As the
objective function is an increasing function of u1, so in absence of individual constraints i.e.
(7c), the source constraint (7b) will be satisfied with equality. From that we can calculate the
value of u1 in terms of r.
u1 =
√
η1 − η2||c〈2〉||2r2, where η1 = Ps
αP1
, η2 =
(1− α)
α|c1|2
We can write the objective function (7a) in terms of r in following manner: (c1
√
η1−η2r2+||c〈2〉||r)2
1+r2
By differentiating with respect to r and equating it to 0, we get the above result.
If the solution obtained in the above manner satisfy all the individual constraints, then we
have indeed solved the problem (7). But, if for any ui individual constraint is violated, then we
solve the problem using the following iterative approach.
1) Initialize parameters t1 = 0 and t2 = 1.
2) Sort the relay nodes in descending order based on u∗i /umax,i, ∀i ∈ {2, · · · ,M}. Sort the
vector c〈2〉 and umax accordingly. In sorted list let us denote the first variable as u(2).
Update the parameter t1 = t1 + c(2)u(2) and t2 = t2 + u2(2). Now we have to solve the
following optimization problem:
max
(t1 + c1u1 + ĉ
tû)2
t2 + ||û||2 (8a)
s.t. αP1u21 +
(1− α)P1
|hsd|2 (t1 + ĉ
tû)2 = Ps (8b)
where û and ĉ are the vectors obtained after removing u(2) and c(2), respectively.
83) If the solution of problem (8) satisfies all the individual constraints, then optimal solution
is obtained, otherwise repeat step 2 & 3 until the solution obtained satisfy their individual
constraints.
Remark: The rationale behind picking the variable u(2) corresponding to arg maxi u∗i /umax,i in
step 2 is: for increasing Ps, u(2) is the first variable to violate its individual constraint and (7a)
increases with u(2) till it reaches the optimum corresponding to that Ps value.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution of the problem (8) is given by u∗1 =
√
η1 − η2(t1 + ||û||r∗)2,
û∗ = ĉ||ĉ||r
∗ where r∗ satisfies the following quadratic polynomial:
q0r
4 + q1r
3 + q2r
2 + q3r + q4 = 0 (9)
where q0 = η2η3t21τ
2, q1 = −2η2t1τ(η1c21 + η3(t2τ 2 − t21)), q2 = η3(η1t21 − η2((t21 − t2τ 2)2 −
2t21t2τ
2))− η1c21(η1− η2t21 + 2η2t2τ 2), q3 = 2t1t2τη3(η1− η2t21 + η2t2τ 2), q4 = t22τ 2(η1− η2η3t21)
η3 = (1 + η2c
2
1), τ = ||ĉ||
Proof: Following the argument of Proposition (1) we can write ĉtû = ||ĉ||r, where ||û|| = r.
Now due to equality constraint (8b), we can express u1 in terms of r as: u1 =
√
η1 − η2(t1 + ||ĉ||r)2
Therefore, optimization problem (8) can be rewritten as:
max
r
(t1 + ||ĉ||r + c1
√
η1 − η2(t1 + ||ĉ||r)2)2
t2 + r2
(10)
By differentiating it with respect to r and equating it to 0, we get the above polynomial equation
in terms of r.
Corollary 1. If r∗ is the real positive root of equation (9) which maximizes the objective function
of problem (10), then the solution of problem (8) is obtained using that r∗.
Proof: As u1 and û calculated using r∗ satisfy the constraint (8b) and maximizes (10),
hence it is indeed the optimal solution of problem (8).
IV. RESULTS
In Figure 2 we plot the capacity (Cd) of source to destination channel with respect to transmit
power at first stage (P1) for multiple α values. Source to relay and relay to destination channel
gains were generated from complex Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. The
9distribution used for source to destination channel is CN (0, 0.25). While plotting the results we
averaged Cd over 100 such network instances. For individual power constraints we considered
Ps = 5 and Pi = 0.1,∀i, whereas, for total power constraint we used Ptot = Ps + M ∗ Pi. As
the SNR value at the destination is an increasing function of P1 and α, so the channel capacity
increases as we increase both the parameters. In Figure 3 we plot the capacity for both total
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Fig. 2. Plot of Cd with respect to P1 for several α values in case of both total and individual constraints.
and individual constraint scenario with respect to number of the relay nodes. As the number of
relay nodes increases the second term in the destination SNR also increases, which results in
increase of Cd.
V. CONCLUSION
In the current article we have presented a beamforming solution for secure communication
using untrusted relay nodes. After justifying SNR based approach, we formulated and solved two
optimization problems – one for total power constraint and other for individual power constraints.
Our current model assumes a perfect CSI for evaluation of optimal scaling vector which may
not be available in several practical scenarios. Therefore, in future we would like to study the
performance of our model for delayed CSI.
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